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OPERATOR APPROACH TO VALUES OF STOCHASTIC GAMES WITH
VARYING STAGE DURATION
SYLVAIN SORIN AND GUILLAUME VIGERAL
Abstract. We study the links between the values of stochastic games with varying stage dura-
tion h, the corresponding Shapley operators T and Th = hT+ (1− h)Id and the solution of the
evolution equation f˙t = (T − Id)ft. Considering general non expansive maps we establish two
kinds of results, under both the discounted or the finite length framework, that apply to the class
of “exact” stochastic games. First, for a fixed length or discount factor, the value converges as
the stage duration go to 0. Second, the asymptotic behavior of the value as the length goes to
infinity, or as the discount factor goes to 0, does not depend on the stage duration. In addition,
these properties imply the existence of the value of the finite length or discounted continuous
time game (associated to a continuous time jointly controlled Markov process), as the limit of
the value of any discretization with vanishing mesh.
1. Introduction
The operator introduced by Shapley [17] to study zero-sum discounted stochastic games is a
non expansive map T from a Banach space to itself. Several results have been obtained by using
a similar “operator approach” in the framework of zero-sum repeated games, [16], [8], [18], [12].
In particular the analysis extends to general repeated games (including incomplete information
and signals, see [6] Chapter IV) and arbitrary evaluation of the sequence of stage payoffs.
An important part of the literature studies families of evaluations with vanishing stage weight
(either length going to infinity or discount factor going to 0) and the main issue is the existence
of an asymptotic value. Assuming that the stage duration is one, each evaluation induces a time
ponderation on R+ and vanishing stage weight leads to an increasing number na of interactions
during any given fraction a ∈]0, 1[ of the game that has been played according to this ponderation.
We consider here another direction of research: the time ponderation is fixed and the stage
duration vanishes (leading to a continuous time game at the limit). Note that, as above, this
leads to an increasing number na of interactions.
We study in particular stochastic games with varying stage duration, in the spirit of Neyman
[10]. Our approach is based on the non expansive property of the Shapley operator to derive con-
vergence results, characterization of the values, and links with evolution equations in continuous
time.
The structure of the paper is as follows:
We first recall the definition of the Shapley operator T associated to a stochastic game (Section
2) and the related finite and discounted iterations.
We introduce in Section 3 two models of stochastic games with variable stage duration h : lin-
earization via “exact” games, and “discretization” of a continuous time model. In both frame-
works we describe the link with the fractional Shapley operator Th.
Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the abstract analysis of various fractional iterations of a general
non expansive map T:
- first in the finite iteration case, where we establish relations between the n-iterate Tnh and the
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solution of the evolution equation f˙t = (T− Id)ft at time t = nh,
- then in the discounted case, where we identify the λ-discounted evaluation associated to Th as
the µ = λ1+λ−λh -discounted evaluation associated to T.
We then apply these results to the case of exact stochastic games. Section 6 and 7 are respectively
devoted to the study of games with finite length and with discount factor. In both frameworks
we establish results of two different kinds. Firstly, for a fixed evaluation (finite length or discount
factor), the value of a game with varying stage duration converges as the stage duration goes to
0. Secondly, the asymptotic behavior of the value (for large length or small discount factor) does
not depend on the stage duration.
In Section 8 we study the discretization of the continuous time game by approximating with exact
games and we prove convergence of the values in the finite length and discounted case as the stage
duration vanishes.
The last section provide concluding comments.
2. Stochastic games and Shapley operator
Consider a two person zero-sum stochastic game G with a finite state space Ω. I and J are
compact metric action spaces, X and Y are the sets of regular probabilities on the corresponding
Borel σ-algebra. g is a bounded measurable payoff function from Ω× I×J to R (with multilinear
extension to X ×Y ) and for each (i, j) ∈ I× J, P (i, j) is a transition probability from Ω to ∆(Ω)
(the set of probabilities on Ω). g and P are separately continuous on I and J .
The game is played in stages. At stage n, knowing the state ωn, player 1 (resp. 2) chooses
in ∈ I (resp. jn ∈ J), the stage payoff is gn = g(ωn, in, jn). The next state ωn+1 is selected
according to the probability P (in, jn)[ωn] and is announced to the players.
One associates to G a Shapley operator, see Shapley [17], which is a map T from F = RΩ to
itself: f ∈ F 7→ T(f) defined by
(1) T(f)(ω) = val
(x,y)∈X×Y
{g(ω;x, y) + P (x, y)[ω] ◦ f}, ∀ω ∈ Ω
where val
X×Y
is the maxmin = minmax = value operator on X × Y ,
P (x, y)[ω](ω′) =
∫
I×J P (i, j)[ω](ω
′)x(di)y(dj) and for R ∈ RΩ, R ◦ f =∑ζ∈ΩR(ζ)f(ζ).
Note that T is a non expansive map. Moreover T is monotone and translates the constants (for
a converse result see, e.g., Kolokoltsov [5], and Sorin [19] for related consequences) but we will
not use here these additional properties.
One can consider two other frameworks with Ω standard Borel, where T is defined in a similar
way with P (x, y)[ω] ◦ f = ∫Ω f(ζ)P (x, y)[ω](dζ) and where F is either:
- the set of bounded measurable functions on Ω and P (i, j)[ω](A) is separately continous in (i, j)
for each Borel subset A ⊂ Ω (see [6], Prop. VII.1.4),
- or the set of bounded continuous functions on Ω and both maps (x, ω) 7→ I(x, y;ω) = ∫Ω f(ζ)P (x, y)[ω](dζ)
and (y, ω) 7→ I(x, y;ω) are continuous for any bounded continuous function f on Ω (see [6], Prop.
VII.1.5).
For more general conditions see Nowak [13], [14].
From now on we assume that one of these cases holds so that T is well defined from some
Banach space F to itself.
Recall that Vn = T
n(0) is the value of the n-stage game with total evaluation
∑n
m=1 gm (as a
function of the initial state) so that the normalized value is vn =
Vn
n .
Wλ, which is the unique fixed point of f 7→ T((1 − λ)f) on F , is the un-normalized value of the
discounted game with total evaluation
∑∞
m=1 gm(1− λ)m−1 and the normalized discounted value
is wλ = λWλ.
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3. Stochastic games with varying stage duration
Let us introduce, for each (i, j) ∈ I × J , the kernel Q(i, j) such that P (i, j) = Id+Q(i, j) and
write G = (g,Q) for a stochastic game defined as above. One introduces two families of varying
stage duration games, see Neyman [10], associated to G.
3.1. Exact sequence.
Consider G as a game with stage duration one. Given a step size h ∈ (0, 1], define an “exact”
game Gh with stage duration h, stage payoff hg and stage transition Ph = Id + h Q. That is,
Gh = (h g, h Q).
Gh appears as a linearization of the game G. During a stage of duration h both the payoff and
the state variation are proportional with factor h to those of a stage of duration one.
Definition 3.1. Given h ∈ [0, 1], let Th = (1− h)Id+ hT.
Then one has:
Proposition 3.1.
If T is the Shapley operator of G, then Th is the Shapley operator of the game G
h.
Proof. Since Th(f) = (1 − h)f + h val{g + P ◦ f} = (1 − h)f + val{h g + h(Id + Q) ◦ f}, one
obtains
(2) Th(f) = val{h g + Ph ◦ f}
with Ph = Id+ hQ.
Hence Th is the one stage operator associated to the game G
h,. 
We will consider the associated finitely repeated games and discounted games asociated to Gh.
Natural questions are, in the finite case :
1) given a total length M , what is the asymptotic behavior of the value of the N -stage game with
stage duration h, as h vanishes and Nh =M .
2) what is the asymptotic behavior of the value, as Nh goes to ∞,
and similarly in the discounted framework.
These topics will be addressed in the general setting of a non expansive map T in Sections 4
and 5. In both cases we will obtain explicit formulations for the limits.
3.2. Discretization.
Let G = (g,Q) be a stochastic game with a finite state space. We consider here a continuous
time jointly controlled Markov process associated to the kernel Q.
Explicitly, define Pt(i, j) as the continuous time homogeneous Markov chain on Ω, indexed by
R
+, with generator Q(i, j):
(3) P˙t(i, j) = Pt(i, j)Q(i, j).
Given a stepsize h ∈ (0, 1], Gh has to be considered as the discretization with mesh h of the game
in continuous time G where the state variable follows Pt and is controlled by both players, see
[25], [21], [3], [9].
More precisely the players act at time s = kh by choosing actions (is, js) (at random according
to some xs, resp. ys), knowing the current state. Between time s and s+ h, the state ωt evolves
with conditional law Pt following (3) with Q(is, js) and P
s = Id.
The associated Shapley operator of this stochastic game is Th with
Th(f) = val
X×Y
{gh + Ph ◦ f}
where gh(ω0, x, y) stands for E[
∫ h
0 g(ωt;x, y)dt] and P
h(x, y) =
∫
I×J P
h(i, j)x(di)y(dj).
The corresponding finitely repeated and discounted games will be analyzed in Section 8.
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4. Finite iterations of non expansive maps and evolution equations
Consider a non expansive map T from a Banach space Z to itself. In this section we recall
basic results concerning its iterations and the corresponding discrete and continuous dynamics.
4.1. Finite iteration.
The n-stage iteration starting from z ∈ Z is Un = Tn(z) hence satisfies
Un − Un−1 = −(Id−T)(Un−1)
which can be considered as a discretization of the differential equation
(4) f˙t = −(Id−T)ft, f0 = z.
(Note that this is a special case of the differential inclusion f˙t ∈ −Aft, for the accretive (maximal
monotone) operator A = Id−T.)
The comparison between the iterates of T and the solution ft(z) of the differential equation
(4) is given by the generalized Chernoff’s formula [7], [2], see, e.g., Bre´zis [1], p.16:
Proposition 4.1.
(5) ‖ft(z) −Tn(z))‖ ≤ ‖z −T(z)‖
√
t+ (n− t)2.
In particular with z = 0 and t = n, one obtains
(6) ‖fn(0)
n
− vn‖ ≤ ‖T(0)‖√
n
where as before, Tn(0) = Vn = nvn.
Given h ∈ (0, 1], a change of time shows that ft/h(z) is the solution of
(7) g˙t = −(Id−T)gt
h
, g0 = z.
4.2. Interpolation.
Given h ∈ [0, 1] introduce again:
(8) Th = (1− h)Id+ hT.
Then using (7) which is
g˙t = −(Id−Th)gt, g0 = z,
one obtains from (5)
(9) ‖ft(z)−Tnh(z)‖ ≤ ‖z −Tz‖
√
th+ (nh− t)2,
hence in particular with h = tn
(10) ‖ft(z)−Tnt/n(z)‖ ≤ ‖z −Tz‖
t√
n
,
or
(11) ‖fnh(z)−Tnh(z)‖ ≤ ‖z −Tz‖h
√
n.
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4.3. Eulerian schemes.
More generally for a sequence of step sizes {hk} in [0, 1] one defines inductively an Eulerian scheme
{zk} by
zk+1 − zk = hk+1(T − Id)(zk)
or
zk+1 = Thk+1zk.
For two sequences {hk}, {hˆℓ} in [0, 1], with associated Eulerian schemes
zk+1 = Thk+1zk,
zˆℓ+1 = Thˆℓ+1 zˆℓ,
Vigeral [23] obtains
Proposition 4.2.
(12) ‖zˆℓ − zk‖ ≤ ‖zˆ0 − z‖+ ‖z0 − z‖+ ‖z −Tz‖
√
(σk − σˆℓ)2 + τk + τˆℓ, ∀z ∈ z,
(13) ‖ft(z)− zk‖ ≤ ‖z −Tz‖
√
(σk − t)2 + τk,
with z0 = z, σk =
∑k
i=1 hi , τk =
∑k
i=1 h
2
i , σˆℓ =
∑ℓ
j=1 hˆj , τˆℓ =
∑ℓ
j=1 hˆ
2
j .
In particular this gives, in the uniform case hi = h,∀i
(14) ‖ft(z) −Tnh(z))‖ ≤ ‖z −Tz‖
√
nh2 + (nh− t)2
and coincides with (10) and (11) at t = nh.
4.4. Two approximations.
Equation (9) or more generally (13) corresponds to two approximations:
i) Comparison on a compact interval [0,M ] of ft to the linear interpolation Tˆ
s
M/n of {TmM/n},m =
0, ..., n, which is, using (10) :
‖ft(0)− Tˆnt/MM/n (0)‖ ≤ K
M√
n
, ∀t ∈ [0,M ],
for some constant K.
Or more generally if one considers a sequence of step sizes {hi}, i = 1, ..., k with σk =
∑k
i=1 hi =
M , hi ≤ h,∀i and ΠiThi = Th1 ◦ · · · ◦Thk , one has:
(15) ‖fM (0)−ΠiThi(0)‖ ≤ K
√
hM.
Thus the composite iteration ΠiThi converges to the solution of (4) as the mesh h goes to 0.
ii) Asymptotic comparison of the behavior of ft, solution of (4) and iterations of the form
ΠiThi with step size hi ≤ 1 and total length σk = t:
(16) ‖ft(0) −ΠiThi(0)‖ ≤ K
√
t.
5. Discounted iterations of non expansive maps
5.1. General properties.
For λ ∈ (0, 1] denote again by Wλ the unique fixed point of z 7→ T ((1− λ)z) and let wλ = λWλ.
We recall some basic evaluations, see e.g. [22].
Proposition 5.1.
‖wλ‖ ≤ ‖T(0)‖,
‖wλ − wµ‖ ≤ 2|1− λ
µ
|‖T(0)‖.
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Proof. First, one has:
‖Wλ‖ − ‖T(0)‖ ≤ ‖Wλ −T(0)‖ = ‖T([1− λ]Wλ)−T(0)‖ ≤ (1− λ)‖Wλ‖
which implies λ‖Wλ‖ ≤ ‖T(0)‖.
Moreover :
‖Wλ −Wµ‖ = ‖T([1− λ]Wλ)−T([1− µ]Wµ)‖
≤ ‖[1− λ]Wλ − [1− µ]Wµ‖
≤ (1− λ)‖Wλ −Wµ‖+ |λ− µ‖‖Wµ‖
thus
λ‖Wλ −Wµ‖ ≤ |λ− µ‖‖Wµ‖ ≤ |λ− µ|
µ
‖T(0)‖.
On the other hand:
‖wλ − wµ‖ ≤ λ‖Wλ −Wµ‖+ |λ− µ‖‖Wµ‖
hence
‖wλ −wµ‖ ≤ 2|λ− µ‖‖Wµ‖
and the result follows from ‖Wµ‖ ≤ ‖T(0)‖/µ. 
5.2. Discounted values.
For any non expansive operator T on Z and h ∈ (0, 1], introduce
W hλ = Th((1− λh)W hλ )
as the unique fixed point point of u 7→ Th((1− λh)u) and define
(17) whλ = λW
h
λ = λTh(
1− λh
λ
whλ).
W hλ is the un-normalized λ-evaluation computed through a stage of duration h using the lin-
earization Th of T and w
h
λ is the associated normalization.
Recall that for h = 1, Th = T and wλ = w
h
λ.
Proposition 5.2.
whλ = wµ, with µ =
λ
1 + λ− λ h.
Proof. By definition of Th,
whλ = λ((1− h)Id + hT)(
1 − λh
λ
whλ)
= (1− h)(1 − λh)whλ + λhT(
1− λh
λ
whλ).
Hence
(1 + λ− λh)whλ = λT(
1− λh
λ
whλ)
which is
whλ = µT(
1− µ
µ
whλ)
for µ = λ1+λ−λ h .
The non expansiveness of T yields uniqueness, hence the result. 
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5.3. Vanishing duration.
Introduce Dhλ, the auxiliary one stage operator associated to the λ-discounted evaluation of Th,
defined by
Dhλ z = λTh[(
1− λh
λ
)z]
which is (1− λh) contracting.
In particular Dhλ w
h
λ = w
h
λ and for h = 1, D
1
λ wλ = wλ.
Proposition 5.3. For any z ∈ Z
whλ = limn→+∞
(Dhλ)
nz
and whλ → w λ
1+λ
as h→ 0 with
‖whλ − w λ
1+λ
‖ ≤ Cλh.
Proof. The first equality follows from definition (17).
By Proposition 5.1 ∥∥∥whλ − w λ
1+λ
∥∥∥ ≤ C‖1− 1 + λ− λh
1 + λ
‖
≤ Cλh.

More generally one can consider a sequence of step sizes {hi} with hi ≤ h and
∑
i hi = +∞
and the associated operator ΠiD
hi
λ .
Lemma 5.1. For any z ∈ Z and any sequence h1, · · · , hn,
‖Πni=1Dhiλ (z)− w λ
1+λ
‖ ≤ 2‖T(0)‖ max
1≤i≤n
hi + (‖T(0)‖ + ‖z‖)Πni=1(1− λhi).
Proof. By non expansiveness,
‖Πni=1Dhiλ (z)−Πni=1Dhiλ (w λ
1+λ
)‖ ≤ ‖z − w λ
1+λ
‖ Πni=1(1− λhi) ≤ (‖T(0)‖ + ‖z‖) Πni=1(1− λhi).
Hence it is enough to show that ‖Πni=1Dhiλ (w λ
1+λ
)− w λ
1+λ
‖ ≤ 2‖T(0)‖max1≤i≤n hi.
Let dk = ‖Πni=kDhiλ (w λ
1+λ
)− w λ
1+λ
‖. Then
dk ≤ ‖Πni=kDhiλ (w λ
1+λ
)−Dhkλ (w λ
1+λ
)‖+ ‖Dhkλ (w λ
1+λ
)−w λ
1+λ
‖
≤ (1− λhk)dk+1 + ‖Dhkλ (w λ
1+λ
)− w λ
1+λ
‖.
Now, for any h,
‖Dhλ(w λ
1+λ
)− w λ
1+λ
‖ = ‖(1 − h)(1− λh)w λ
1+λ
+ λhT(
1− λh
λ
w λ
1+λ
)− w λ
1+λ
‖
≤ λh2‖w λ
1+λ
‖+ ‖λhT(1 − λh
λ
w λ
1+λ
)− h(1 + λ)w λ
1+λ
‖
= λh2‖w λ
1+λ
‖+ ‖λhT(1 − λh
λ
w λ
1+λ
)− λhT( 1
λ
w λ
1+λ
)‖
≤ 2λh2‖w λ
1+λ
‖
≤ 2‖T(0)‖λh2.
Hence
dk ≤ (1− λhk)dk+1 + 2‖T(0)‖λh2k
= (1− λhk)dk+1 + λhk(2‖T(0)‖hk)
≤ max(dk+1, 2‖T(0)‖hk).
Since dn+1 = 0 we get d1 ≤ 2‖T(0)‖max1≤i≤n hi as claimed. 
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In particular one gets
Proposition 5.4. For any z ∈ Z, and any sequence {hi} with hi ≤ h and
∑
i hi = +∞,
‖Π∞i=1Dhiλ (z)− w λ
1+λ
‖ ≤ 2‖T(0)‖h.
5.4. Asymptotic properties.
An easy consequence of Proposition 5.2 is that for a given h, whλ has the same asymptotic behavior,
as λ tends to 0, as wλ.
Proposition 5.5.
‖whλ − wλ‖ ≤ 2Cλ.
Proof. By Proposition 5.1, ∥∥∥whλ − wλ∥∥∥ = 2C|1− (1 + λ− λh|
≤ 2Cλ.

To generalize this property in order to apply it to games with varying duration we need an
additional assumption on the operator T.
Definition 5.1. The operator T satisfies assumption (H) if there exists two nondecreasing func-
tions k :]0, 1]→ R+ and ℓ : [0,+∞]→ R+ with k(λ) = o(√λ) as λ goes to 0 and
‖D1λ(z)−D1µ(z)‖ ≤ k(|λ− µ|)ℓ(‖z‖)
for all (λ, µ) ∈]0, 1]2 and z ∈ Z.
Proposition 5.6. If T satisfies (H) then for any z ∈ Z and any sequence {hi} with
∑
i hi = +∞,
‖Π∞i=1Dhiλ (z) −wλ‖ goes to 0 as λ goes to 0.
Proof. Since Dhiλ is 1−λh contracting and
∑
i hi = +∞, Π∞i=1Dhiλ (z) is independent of z and one
may assume z = wλ.
Define dn = ‖Πni=1Dhiλ (wλ)− wλ‖ hence d0 = 0 and
dn ≤ ‖Πni=1Dhiλ (wλ)−Dhnλ (wλ)‖+ ‖Dhnλ (wλ)− wλ‖
≤ (1− λhn)dn−1 + ‖Dhnλ (wλ)−wλ‖.
For any h,
‖Dhλ(wλ)− wλ‖ ≤ ‖(1− h)(1 − λh)wλ + λhT(
1− λh
λ
wλ)− wλ‖
= h(1 + λ− λh)
∥∥∥∥ λ1 + λ− λhT(1− λhλ wλ)− wλ
∥∥∥∥
= h(1 + λ− λh)∥∥D1µ(wλ)−D1λ(wλ)∥∥ with µ = λ1 + λ− λh
≤ h(1 + λ− λh)ℓ(‖wλ‖)k
(
λ2(1− h)
1 + λ− λh
)
by (H)
≤ 2hℓ(‖T (0)‖)k(λ2).
Hence
dn ≤ (1− λhn)dn−1 + λhn
[
2ℓ(‖T (0)‖)k(λ
2)
λ
]
≤ max
(
dn−1, 2ℓ(‖T (0)‖)k(λ
2)
λ
)
and dn ≤ 2ℓ(‖T (0)‖)k(λ
2)
λ for all n. The result follows since by assumption k(λ
2) = o(λ). 
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5.5. Invariant properties.
We now consider another family of operators parametrized by α ∈ [0, 1].
Define for α ∈ [0, 1], T˜α by
(18) T˜αz = (1− α)z +T(αz).
Thus T˜α is non expansive, hence for λ ∈]0, 1] one can consider the associated λ-discounted fixed
point w˜αλ defined by
w˜αλ = λT˜α(
1− λ
λ
w˜αλ ).
Note that for α = 1, w˜αλ = wλ.
Proposition 5.7.
w˜αλ = wµ, with µ =
λ
α+ λ− λ α.
Proof. Direct computation gives
w˜αλ = λT˜α(
1− λ
λ
w˜αλ )
= λ[(1 − α)(1 − λ)
λ
w˜αλ +T(α
(1− λ)
λ
w˜αλ )].
Thus
(α+ λ− λα)w˜αλ = λT(α
(1− λ)
λ
w˜αλ ))
which is
w˜αλ = µT(
1− µ
µ
w˜αλ )
for µ = λα+λ−λ α , hence the result. 
Corollary 5.1. For λ ≤ 1/2, w˜
λ
1−λ
λ does not depend on λ and equals w1/2.
6. Finitely repeated exact games
We consider the family of exact games Gh = (h g, hQ) with h ∈ [0, 1].
6.1. Approximation of the value.
The recursive equation for the un-normalized value V hn of the n-stage game G
h (of total length
nh) is given by:
V hn (ω) = val[h g(ω; .) + Ph(.)[ω] ◦ V hn−1]
so that
V hn = ThV
h
n−1 = T
n
h(0)
Let f be the solution of (4) with T satisfying (1). Using the results of Section 4 in particular
(11) we obtain:
Proposition 6.1.
There exists a constant L such that for all n and h ∈ [0, 1]
‖V hn − fnh(0)‖ ≤ Lh
√
n.
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6.2. Vanishing step sizes.
The previous Proposition 6.1 shows that vhn =
V hn
N , which is the normalized value of the n-stage
game Gh with length N = nh, satisfies:
‖vhn −
fN (0)
N
‖ ≤ L
√
h
N
.
In fact Proposition 4.2 induces a more precise result for vanishing stage duration, that we now
describe.
Given t > 0 and a finite partition Ht of [0, t], t0 = 0, ..., tk = t, induced by step sizes {hi}, 1 ≥
hi > 0, i = 1, ..., k,
∑
i≤j hi = tj, we define its mesh as m(Ht) = maxi hi.
We consider the k stage game where the duration of stage i is hi. Let U(Ht) be its un-normalized
value (the normalized value is u(Ht) =
U(Ht)
t ). Thus U(Ht) = T
h1 ◦ · · · ◦Thk(0).
Definition 6.1. V̂t is the limit value on [0, t] if for any sequence of partitions {Hnt } of [0, t] with
vanishing mesh, the sequence of values {U(Hnt )} of the corresponding games converges to V̂t.
Proposition 6.2.
There exists a constant L′ such that for any Ht with m(Ht) ≤ h, the un-normalized value U(Ht)
satisfies
‖U(Ht)− ft(0)‖ ≤ L′
√
h t.
Thus the limit value V̂t exists and is given by V̂t = ft(0).
Proof. The inequality is obtained from equation (13) with σk = t and τk ≤ h t.
The existence of V̂t follows. 
The interpretation of these results is twofold:
first the value of the game with finite length is essentially independent of the duration of the
stages when this duration is small enough,
second, this value is given by the solution of the associated differential equation (4).
Note that V̂t equals also the value of the continuous time game of length t introduced in Neyman
[9].
6.3. Asymptotic analysis.
A further consequence of Proposition 6.2 is that for any t and any k-stage game associated to a
finite partition Ht, with normalized value u(Ht), one has:
Proposition 6.3.
There exists L′ such that for any Ht
‖u(Ht)− ft(0)
t
‖ ≤ L
′
√
t
.
In particular the asymptotic behavior of the (normalized) value of the game depends only on its
total length t (and not on the durations of the individual stages) up to a term O( 1√
t
). Again the
comparison quantity is given by the normalized solution of the associated differential equation (4).
7. Discounted exact games
7.1. Values of discounted exact game.
We follow the definition of Neyman (eq. (3) p. 254 in [10]) : the (normalized) value whλ of the λ
discounted game Gh is the unique solution of
whλ(ω) = valX×Y [hλg(ω, x, y) + (1− hλ)Ph(x, y)[ω] ◦ whλ].
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with Ph = Id+ hQ.
In particular, for h = 1 one recovers wλ = w
1
λ (see 2.5) associated to T defined in (1).
The notation is consistent with the previous Section 5 since one has
Proposition 7.1. whλ corresponds to the solution of (17).
Proof.
whλ = λTh(
1− λh
λ
whλ) = λ[valX×Y [hg(ω, x, y) + Ph(x, y)[ω] ◦
1− λh
λ
whλ].
Hence whλ = λ[valX×Y [hλg(ω, x, y) + (1− hλ)Ph(x, y)[ω] ◦ whλ]. 
A direct computation using Ph = Id+ h Q gives
Proposition 7.2. whλ is the only solution of
ϕ(ω) = valX×Y [g(ω, x, y) +
(1− hλ)
λ
Q(x, y)[ω] ◦ ϕ].
We now apply the results of Section 5
Proposition 7.3.
whλ = wµ, with µ =
λ
1 + λ− λ h.
Proof. Apply Proposition 5.2. 
7.2. Vanishing duration.
We now recover the convergence property in [10].
Corollary 7.1.
For a fixed λ, whλ converges as h goes to 0. The limit, denoted ŵλ, equals w λ
1+λ
, hence is the only
solution of:
(19) ϕ = val[g +
Q
λ
◦ ϕ].
Moreover, ‖whλ − ŵλ‖ ≤ Cλh.
Proof. For the convergence, apply Proposition 5.3.
By definition w λ
1+λ
satisfies
w λ
1+λ
= val[
λ
1 + λ
g +
1
1 + λ
(Id+Q) ◦ w λ
1+λ
].
that is
w λ
1+λ
= val[g +
Q
λ
◦ w λ
1+λ
].

More generally consider a sequence of stage durations {hi} with hi ≤ h and
∑
i hi = +∞ in-
ducing a partition H. The value of the associated λ-discounted gameWHλ is given by Π
+∞
i=1D
hi
λ (0)
hence satisfies
Proposition 7.4.
‖WHλ − ŵλ‖ ≤ 2‖T(0)‖ h .
Proof. Apply Proposition 5.4. 
Once again ŵλ has to be interpreted as the λ-discounted value of the continuous time game,
see [4], [9], [10].
Note that our game theoretic framework is very general, in particular there is no finiteness
assumption on the actions or states.
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7.3. Asymptotic behavior.
The value whλ of the λ discounted game with stage duration h has the same asymptotic behavior,
as λ tends to 0, as wλ.
Proposition 7.5.
‖whλ − wλ‖ ≤ 2Cλ.
Proof. Apply Proposition 5.5. 
More generally one obtains
Proposition 7.6. For any {hi} with
∑
i hi = +∞ inducing a partition H, ‖WHλ − wλ‖ ≤ C ′λ
where C’ depends only on the game..
Proof. Immediate consequence of Proposition 5.6 and its proof, since, by non expansiveness of
the value operator, for any game with a payoff bounded by C the associated Shapley operator T
satisfies assumption (H) with k(λ) = λ = o(
√
λ) and ℓ(‖z‖) = C + ‖z‖. 
7.4. Invariance properties.
Let T be the Shapley operator associated to the game (g,Q). Then T˜α defined by (18) is the
Shapley operator associated to (g, α Q) since
T˜α(f) = valX×Y [g(ω, x, y) + (Id+Q(x, y))[ω] ◦ αf ] + (1− α)f
= valX×Y [g(ω, x, y) + (Id+ αQ(x, y))[ω] ◦ f ].
This implies
Proposition 7.7. For any kernel R, the λ-discounted value of the game G(g; λ(1−λ)R) is inde-
pendent of λ ≤ 1/2 and the only solution of
ϕ(ω) = valX×Y [g(ω, x, y) +R(x, y)[ω] ◦ ϕ].
Proof. Apply Corollary 5.1. 
This shows a tradeoff between the size of the kernel and the discount factor. Taking into
account Proposition 7.3 one derives an invariance property of the value on the product space:
discount factor × stage duration × kernel:
V al(λ, h,R) = V al(
λ
1 + λ− λ h, 1, R) = V al(λ, 1,
1− λ h
1− λ R).
Similar covariance properties were obtained in [9] and [10].
8. Discretization approach
We consider now the game G
h
which corresponds to the discretization of the continuous time
game. We will study two frameworks, like in the previous sections : either a fixed finite length
or a fixed discount factor and we will analyse the behavior of the associated values as the stage
duration h goes to 0.
8.1. Finite length.
The un-normalized value V
h
n of the n-stage game with stage duration h satisfies V
h
n = (Th)
n(0).
Similarly for varying stage duration, corresponding to a partition H, one gets a recursive equation
of the form V H(t) = ΠiThi(0).
Lemma 8.1. There exists C0 such that
‖Th(f)−Th(f)‖ ≤ C0(1 + ‖f‖)h2.
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Proof. By non expansiveness of the value operator,
‖Th(f)−Th(f)‖ ≤ ‖h g(·) − gh(·)‖ + ‖f‖‖Ph(·) − Ph(·)‖
= h O(h) + ‖f‖h O(h)
since Ph = Id+ h Q and P
h = ehQ = Id+ h Q+ h O(h). 
Proposition 8.1.
There exists C depending only of the game G such that for any finite sequence (hi)i≤n in [0, h]
with sum t and corresponding partition H:
‖V H(t)− V̂t‖ ≤ C(
√
ht+ ht+ ht2).
In particular for a given t, V H(t) tends to V̂t as h goes to 0.
Proof. The value of any game with total length less than t is bounded by some C1t, independently
of h. Hence non expansiveness of the operators as well as the previous Lemma 8.1 gives
‖V H(t)−ΠiThi(0)‖ = ‖ΠiThi(0) −ΠiThi(0)‖
≤
∥∥∥∥Th1 ( Πi≥2Thi(0)
)
−Th1
(
Π
i≥2
Thi(0)
)∥∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥∥Th1 ( Πi≥2Thi(0)
)
−Th1
(
Π
i≥2
Thi(0)
)∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥ Πi≥2Thi(0) − Πi≥2Thi(0)
∥∥∥∥ +C0h21
(
1 + C1
n∑
i=2
hi
)
.
Without loss of generality C1 ≥ 1 hence by summation,
‖V H(t)−ΠiThi(0)‖ ≤ C0C1(1 + t)
n∑
i=1
h2i
≤ C h(1 + t)
n∑
i=1
hi
= C h t(1 + t)
for C = C0C1. Then Proposition 6.2 yields the result. 
Remark 8.1. For a given h, the right hand term is quadratic in t, hence we do not link the
asymptotic behavior of the normalized quantity vhn =
V
h
n
nh and of v̂t =
V̂t
t . However if n is a
function of h converging slowly enough to infinity, the previous proposition can be used. For
example for n(h) = 1
h
√
h
(so that t(h) = 1√
h
), one has
‖vhn(h) − v̂t(h)‖ = O(
√
h).
8.2. Discounted case.
We consider uniform stage duration h. The normalized value whk of the discretization with mesh
h of the λ-discounted continuous game satisfies the fixed point equation
whλ(ω) = valX×Y
[∫ h
0
λe−λtg(ωt, x, y) + e−λhPh(x, y)[ω] ◦ whλ
]
.
Proposition 8.2.
For a given λ, whλ tends to ŵλ as h goes to 0.
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Proof. The equations for whλ and w
h
λ, as well as the non expansiveness of the value operator, give:
‖whλ − whλ‖ ≤ λh
∥∥∥∥g(·) − 1h
∫ h
0
e−λtgt(·)
∥∥∥∥ + e−λh‖whλ − whλ‖+ ‖whλ‖‖Ph − Ph‖
+(1− λh− e−λh)‖whλ‖
≤ λO(h2) + e−λh‖whλ − whλ‖+O(h2) + λ2O(h2)
hence for a fixed λ, (1− e−λh)‖whλ − whλ‖ = O(h2) and the result follows from Corollary 7.1. 
Similar properties were obtained in [10].
For an alternative approach to the limit behavior of the discretization of the continuous model,
relying on viscosity solution tools and extending to various information structures on the state,
see [20].
9. Extensions and concluding comments
9.1. Stochastic games: no signals on the state.
Consider a finite stochastic game where the players know only the initial distribution m ∈ ∆(Ω)
and the actions at each stage.
The basic equation for the exact game with duration h is then
Tˆhf(m) = val[hg(m;x, y) +
∑
ij
xiyjf(m ∗ Ph(i, j))].
with [m ∗Ph(i, j)](ω) =
∑
zm(z)Ph(i, j)[z](ω) being the image of the probability m by the kernel
Ph(i, j).
The equation
Tˆh = hTˆ+ (1− h)Id
does not hold anymore and T− Id has to be replaced by limh→0 Tˆh−Idh in (4). The study of such
games with varying duration thus seems more involved.
9.2. Link with games with uncertain duration.
Notice that Th = (1 − h)Id + hT is a particular case of an operator of the form
∑
i αiT
i, αi ≥
0,
∑
αi = 1, which corresponds to some generalized iterate [8, 12] of T. Hence all the values
computed in sections 4.3, 5.3 and so on, can also be seen as the value of some games with
uncertain duration. See [23] for specific remarks in the particular case of V hn .
9.3. Oscillations.
Several examples of stochastic games (either with a finite set of states and compact sets of actions
[24], or compact set of states and finite set of actions [26]) were recently constructed for which the
values vn and vλ do not converge. Hence the values of the corresponding games with vanishing
duration (and thus their limit as continuous time games) do not converge when t goes to infinity
or λ to 0.
9.4. Comparison to the literature.
The approach here is different from the one of Neyman [10] : the proofs are based on properties
of operators and not on strategies. For example [10] shows that playing optimally in (19) will
imply Corollary 7.1.
By comparison our tools consider only the values and apply to any non expansive map T.
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9.5. Main results.
The main results can be summarized in two parts:
- for a given finite length (or discounted evaluation) the value of the game with vanishing stage
duration converges thus defining a limit value for the associated continuous time game. Moreover
the limit is described explicitly.
- as the length goes to ∞ or the discount factor goes to 0, the impact of the stage duration
goes to 0 and the asymptotic behavior of the normalized value function is independent of the
discretization.
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